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Abstract— Starting in Jan 2012, the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Autonomous Mission 
Operations (AMO) Project began to investigate the ability to create and execute “single button” crew 
initiated autonomous activities [1]. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) designed and built a fluid 
transfer hardware test-bed to use as a sub-system target for the investigations of intelligent procedures that 
would command and control a fluid transfer test-bed, would perform self-monitoring during fluid transfers, 
detect anomalies and faults, isolate the fault and recover the procedures function that was being executed, all 
without operator intervention. In addition to the development of intelligent procedures, the team is also 
exploring various methods for autonomous activity execution where a planned timeline of activities are 
executed autonomously and also the initial analysis of crew procedure development. This paper will detail the 
development of intelligent procedures for the NASA MSFC Autonomous Fluid Transfer System (AFTS) as 
well as the autonomous plan execution capabilities being investigated.  
I. Introduction
 Manned deep space missions, with extreme communication delays with Earth based assets, presents 
significant challenges for what the on-board procedure content will encompass as well as the planned execution of 
the procedures. Manned deep space missions are envisioned as minimal crew with a currently unspecified amount of 
crew autonomy due to the light time delays in communication. Questions arise as to the number of crew, crew make-
up and skills set, and how to move mission control center based operations to on-board for such a mission. Some of 
the answers to these questions encompass how autonomous the vehicle is, and the depth and scope of the procedure 
system placed on-board for crew use.  
The AFTS consists of two fluid tanks, one for a source of supply connected to one for multi-use. There are two 
command-able transfer legs, a command-able return transfer leg, and one manual leg for pure manual operations. 
Each tank contains a pressure sensor at the bottom of the tank, a temperature sensor and a fluid heater that is 
interfaced with each tank at approximately the ¾ level up from the bottom. Each command-able transfer leg contains 
a fluid pump, pressure sensors before and after each pump and a flow meter after the pump. An additional third flow 
meter is placed just before the Multi-Tank for fault tolerance of either transfer leg. The return leg which transfers 
fluid from the Multi-Tank to the Supply Tank has a single command-able pump which is used simply to return fluid 
back to the supply tank. The return leg is semi-automated since there are no flow meters or pressure sensors in use 
on this transfer leg. This system architecture allows a single fault tolerance as to transfer leg pump failures and flow 
meter failures. The manual transfer leg then adds an additional fault tolerance when both the primary and backup 
transfer legs have been failed.  
Once the AFTS hardware was built and the Arduino Controller command and telemetry interfaces were 
developed, an operations concept was needed to determine the requirements for autonomous operations of the 
system. Today it is common practice for the crew to initiate activities such as fluid transfer, after which they are 
monitored continuously by the ground. We desired the crew to operate the AFTS with “Single Button” functions in a 
“fire and forget” fashion. The functions must perform the activity, monitor the system during the activity, detect any 
failures of the sub-system, isolate failures and then recover the original function that was requested by the crew 
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through to completion.  The intelligence of each function or activity was to be embedded within the transfer 
procedures to be developed. Since this was a fluid transfer sub-system, the functions would involve the transference 
of fluid in pre-selectable quantities and optional crew input quantities. The operational activities selected were ¼ 
tank, ½ tank, full tank and crew selectable X number of gallons transfers over the primary, backup and return 
transfer legs of the AFTS. Since the AFTS contains fluid heaters, a “Set Temperature” function was also envisioned 
for the development. During nominal space flight operations, flight rules, payload regulations and safety rules are 
continually monitored during operations; today, these rules are monitored by ground, and potential or actual 
problems are detected and responded to by the ground. It was desired that an autonomous monitoring system be 
employed for further enhancement and demonstration of ground operations movement to on-board capabilities. 
Further safety controls were desired such as “Single Button” AFTS Safing, where only one crew action is required 
to safe the complete test-bed. With the concept defined, the Software Requirements Specification was developed and 
work began. 
Figure 1:  AFTS Test Bed Top View 
II. AFTS Procedure System Architecture 
The Marshall Space Flight team, with extensive experience with the Timeliner system on-board ISS [2], decided 
that the Timeliner-TLX automated procedure system met the procedural development requirements of the operations 
concept. The Timeliner-TLX system is both a procedure development environment and a procedure execution 
engine. Timeliner-TLX procedures are packaged as a file called a bundle and the procedures within the bundle are 
independently executed sequences that share global data within the bundle and also global data between all bundles 
for data exchanges between procedures. Another key feature of the Timeliner-TLX system is the built in sequence 
status telemetry available to all sequences, allowing a sequence’s execution status to be available to all other 
sequences. A bundle is “installed” into the Timeliner-TLX engine making the sequences available for execution. 
The HAL9000 Space Operating System[3] is a prototype system that encompasses both procedure execution and the 
real-time planning and re-planning of procedures. The design of the execution component of the system has been 
utilized for ISS Payload Operations[1] successfully and could be adapted easily for AFTS. The execution 
component design, which requires use of Timeliner, includes the “Single Button” functionality requirement, and this 
design also provides for autonomous monitoring to support Flight Rule, Payload Regulation and Safety rules. In 
fact, the HAL 9000 Execution Component has Safety designed in as a real-time operator with command capability.  
The HAL 9000 Timeliner-TLX architecture divides operations into 9 auto-operators (HALMain, GN+C, Power, 
ECLSS, Comm, Propulsion, Safety, Robotics and Activity), where each auto-operator operates within a separate 
Timeliner-TLX Engine. Each auto-operator has a suite of bundles that contain the intelligent procedures required to 
operate the specific sub-system. For the AFTS test bed, only three of the auto-operators were carried over for the 
division of procedure responsibility, packaged into three bundles. The design then included 3 on-board operator’s 
(Timeliner-TLX Bundles), based upon the HAL 9000 Execution component, HAL Main (the mission manager), 
Safety, and the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) operators. HAL Main would be 
responsible for the startup and initialization of the AFTS as well as the Safety and ECLSS procedure installation. 
Safety would monitor all Flight Rules and other condition rules associated with safe operations of the AFTS and 
would also contain the single crew action system safe capability. ECLSS would own all the intelligent procedures 
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that pertained to fluid transfers. This design allowed the complete AFTS initialization and procedure installation for 
operations to be activated with a single HAL Main install command. With the division of requirements allocated 
between the three automated-operators, it was time to develop the detailed procedures themselves. 
Figure 2:  AFTS Test Bed Side View 
Figure 3: AFTS Context Diagram 
III. AFTS Procedure Design 
The procedure architecture allocated 3 operators, HALMain, Safety and ECLSS. The HAL Main Timeliner-TLX 
initialization procedure becomes active automatically upon installation. The first action taken is the Safety 
procedures are installed and safety monitoring becomes active automatically. The crew is then inquired of the status 
of the manual valves for confirmation of a “Ready for Operations” state. Once HAL Main determines it is safe to 
operate the AFTS, it then installs the ECLSS procedures for crew availability. This is inherently safe as the transfer 
procedures are not available for activation unless the AFTS is deemed operational. Once power is removed from the 
AFTS, the HAL Main monitoring procedures remove the ECLSS auto-procedures which inhibit inadvertent 
commanding to the sub-system by procedure execution as they are simply not available to be activated. This 
autonomous software installation and removal functionality is carried over from the initial ISS Timeliner HAL3 [2] 
Supply 
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design. It also frees memory allocated to the Timeliner-TLX Engine which executes the procedures, always 
minimizing the amount of memory needed for procedures based upon sub-systems being powered and un-powered. 
The Safety Timeliner-TLX procedures become active automatically upon installation and begin monitoring all 
safety rules employed.  The following rules are enforced: 
Maximum Temperature of the Supply Tank Fluid as 75 degrees F 
Maximum Temperature of the Multi-Use Tank Fluid as 75 degrees F 
Maximum Fluid Level of 27 gallons in the Supply Tank 
Maximum Fluid Level of 27 Gallons in the Multi-Use Tank 
Supply Tank Heater must be off when fluid level is below the heater interface 
Multi-Use Tank Heater must be off when fluid level is below the heater interface 
No two pumps in the ON state simultaneously 
Fluid temperatures were considered less critical than fluid levels as it pertained to the heater interfaces due to the 
nature of the fluid heaters (re-circulating water) and maintaining a fluid level where the heaters could actually intake 
fluid. It was decided that whenever the fluid levels dropped below the heater interfaces, Safety would command the 
heater off autonomously, demonstrating real-time autonomous Safety implementation. A problem with maintaining 
fluid temperature arose due to the location of the temperature sensors (bottom of the tank), and the location of the 
fluid heaters (3/4 full capacity), where only the top layer of fluid was being heated and a non-accurate temperature 
was obtained. This design has been augmented  with fluid recirculation pumps that will pump the cold fluid from the 
bottom of the tanks to the top of the tanks allowing for some temperature control. An artificial “Bottom” and “Top” 
of the tanks were specified so that fluid would never go below a pump interface (Bottom), or overflow out the top 
opening. The artificial bottom and tops are specified in pressure units, the gauge used for fluid transfers. 
The ECLSS Timeliner-TLX procedures provide the “Single Button” intelligent crew activities. Each transfer 
function is required to verify the crew activity before beginning operations. This includes verifying that enough 
fluid, based upon the specific activity, is available within the supply tank and that enough space is available in the 
Multi-Use Tank to receive the fluid transfer. Since each activity contains embedded Fault Detection Isolation and 
Recovery (FDIR), the procedures did not have to determine if the primary and back up transfer legs already 
contained a fault, such as a failed pump, as during the procedure initialization phase, any failure is detected and 
automatically fails over to the opposite transfer leg. For example: if the primary pump is failed and the crew requests 
a ¼ tank transfer over the primary leg, the procedure detects the failed pump and performs the operation on the 
backup transfer leg automatically. The procedure messages the crew on all failure detections and actions being taken 
by the procedure and also directs maintenance when failures are encountered.  Once the transfer procedure passes 
initialization (verifies valve and pump successful operations), the procedure monitors the pressures in the tanks for 
obtaining the desired target pressure and also monitors the specific flow meters during the transfer for detection of 
pump failures as the valves used on the AFTS fail to an open state. If a failure occurs during the transfer, the transfer 
procedure commands the active transfer leg to a safe state and verifies the state. Once the active leg that has failed is 
safed, the transfer procedure activates the opposite transfer leg and completes the remaining fluid transfer quantity 
of the original transfer amount. During activation of the opposite transfer leg, fault detection again takes place and if 
a fault is detected, the failover transfer is aborted and the crew messaged for maintenance of both transfer legs. If no 
failures occur on the opposite transfer leg, once the target fluid pressure is reached, the active transfer leg is safed 
during which fault detection continues. The list of autonomous activities that the ECLSS operator has available is as 
follows: 
¼ Tank Primary Transfer 
¼ Tank Backup Transfer 
½ Tank Primary Transfer 
½ Tank Backup Transfer 
Full Tank Primary Transfer 
Full Tank Backup Transfer 
X Gallon Primary Transfer 
X Gallon Backup Transfer 
Supply Tank Heater On 
Supply Tank Heater Off 
Multi-Use Tank Heater On 
Multi-Use Tank Heater Off 
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Set Supply Tank Temperature 
Set Multi-Use Tank Temperature 
¼ Tank Return Transfer 
½ Tank Return Transfer 
Full Tank Return Transfer 
X Gallon Return Transfer 
Table 1 ECLSS Intelligent Functions 
The “Transfer_Remaining” recovery sequence which is initiated by the each activity’s fault detection logic, is 
not available to the crew directly for stand-alone initiation as this sequence is dependent upon a transfer in progress 
that has failed. Each single button activity contains the specific FDIR logic required for the fluid transfer being 
requested. The result is an operations paradigm of an auto-operator that is employed only when needed and when 
desired, and only a single crew action is required. This capability is a great advancement to flight operations for 
crew and or ground operator work reduction. Imagine a manual fluid transfer procedure being worked by the crew 
that requires a command interface and a specific telemetry display where the crew must command the valves and 
pumps, perform the monitoring of the pressures for completion of the transfer as well as the monitoring of the 
valves, pumps and flow meters for failures. The crew, upon detection of a failure, would then be required to pull up 
off nominal operations procedures for the fluid transfer sub-system and command the safing of the transfer leg, 
monitor the safing, calculate the remaining amount needed to be transferred after the failure, command the recovery 
via the opposite transfer leg and perform the monitoring of the remaining transfer in progress as well as the final 
safing of the active transfer leg. This current procedure operations paradigm would require continued crew attention 
which unnecessarily increases the requirement for crew time and function. 
IV. Procedure Format 
 During development of the ECLSS fluid transfer procedures, the development team noticed a consistent 
“format” could be employed for each procedure, essentially segmenting the procedure code.  If a consistent format 
could become a standard for wholly encompassed autonomous procedures, could there be a user interface that could 
be developed to assist the crew for on-board crew authored procedures of this type? Future analysis and 
investigation in this arena should be conducted for determination of not only how crew authored procedures can be 
developed, but also how they can be verified, validated and executed during the mission. The architecture of each of 
the transfer procedures divided the procedure into 7 segments as follows: 
Header Segment 
Declaration Segment 
Validation Segment 
Initialization Segment 
Monitoring Segment 
FDIR Segment 1 
FDIR Segment 2 
The Header Segment is a commented information section describing the functional capability, authorship and 
version control information for the source. This segment has always been part of the Timeliner development coding 
standard used for ISS Timeliner operations [2]. 
The Declaration Segment defines internal variables used within the procedure such as the result of any 
calculations from telemetry the procedure will perform. An example from the AFTS system is the “Target Pressure” 
variable calculated based upon the amount of fluid to be transferred and the current pressure. 
The Validation Segment defines the checks to be performed prior to actual command execution of the activity 
which insures the activity can be accomplished. In the AFTS examples, these checks included verifying the fluid 
quantities availability and capacity within the tanks. 
The Initialization Segment defines the command and command end item checks that are performed to begin the 
function being requested. For the AFTS, the Initialization segment contained the specific valve open and pump on 
commands and their associated end-item verification.  
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The Monitoring Segment defines the parameters to monitor and rate of monitoring while the function is being 
performed. This segment determines whether the function or activity has completed. This segment also has fault 
detection implemented once the function has completed and the sub-system is being safed. An AFTS example is 
where the fluid transfer has completed and the pump is commanded off and the valve commanded close and 
anomalies occur during this safing.  
The FDIR1 Segment handles faults that occur during the procedure execution and is responsible for the actions 
that take place for safing and recovery. This monitoring is in effect after initialization has been successful and fluid 
is flowing. For the AFTS, this segment monitored the flow meters during the fluid transfers. If a fault occurred, this 
segment performed the safing of the transfer leg, the safe verification and also the start of the recovery procedure. A 
common recovery procedure (Transfer_Remaining), was developed that would recover any transfer and it too 
contained fault detection logic.  
The FDIR2 Segment handles faults that occur during the procedures initialization. The main purpose here is to 
detect a fault when the function is being initialized and not yet in progress. The common recovery procedure would 
be started at this point.  Further analysis of this code structure and a corresponding graphical user interface for code 
segment development by crew members could determine the feasibility of on-orbit crew developed intelligent 
procedures. Although there may be pro’s and con’s for and against the crew developing intelligent procedures, it 
remains a potential risk mitigation solution for permanent loss of communications and increases assured crew return. 
V. Planning Autonomous Activities 
The ECLSS fluid transfer procedures actually become wholly contained activities and as such, the activity 
duration and resource utilizations can be quantified upon the first execution during testing and hence can now also 
be easily planned. From the planning perspective, the results of a test execution can derive the time it required to 
transfer a fixed quantity, we know the quantity of the fluid resource desired, and we know the power requirements 
needed for the pump and for the activities duration. As these type activities are performed, resource utilizations can 
be updated for each such as the instances where a degraded pump performance is encountered, affecting the activity 
duration time and power requirements. The instance where a procedure detects a failure and fails over to the 
alternate transfer leg on the AFTS, becomes an autonomous unplanned resource utilization unless the 
Transfer_Remaining recovery activity is planned for the same time period. This then becomes an “overhead” 
booking of resources with the potential of not utilizing all that is planned for the activities, but does ensure the plan 
can be executed autonomously even when failures occur. The delta time that is encountered upon a failover becomes 
the time it takes to send the required safing commands and the time it takes to send the initialization commands in 
the recovery procedure, which is a small delta that can be included in an activities “slip” time. 
VI. Autonomous Plan Execution 
 The AFTS intelligent procedures are activities that execute separately and require fairly fixed resources for 
both nominal and off nominal execution, which made generation of a plan of transfer activities relatively simple. 
The Marshall team decided to investigate how a plan of fluid transfers could be executed autonomously. Two 
concepts, the “Master Bundle” concept from early ISS payload operations capability and the HAL 9000 System 
“Auto-Mode” [3][4] execution concept were selected as potential candidates. The Master Bundle concept required 
an initial “On-Board” plan of activity records where Timeliner auto-procedures had a unique flag in the record 
indicating an auto-procedure. Software would scan the plan and produce Timeliner bundle/sequence source code 
that contained Install Bundle, Start Sequence, HALT Bundle and Remove Bundle commands based upon the 
planned activity start time and activity durations. These were absolute times and unconditional.  
The HAL 9000 System has two different ways of executing activities autonomously. There is the plan of 
activities much the same as the ISS Onboard Short Term Plan (OSTP), but where all the activities are wholly 
contained intelligent procedures, and where the Planning Engine[4] would start each activity, and then there is the 
“Full Auto” mode design where the plan is contained in time ordered state code arrays for every device in the 
activity.  
An AFTS Master Bundle was created manually, with two differences from the ISS payload concept. The AFTS 
Master Bundle was based upon relative time from the start of execution rather than absolute time and would also 
insure no two activities were in execution simultaneously. The master sequence first retrieves the current time and 
then starts each activity relative to the current time that was collected. The start of an activity is conditional as the 
master sequence ensures the previous activity has been completed. Each AFTS activity was given an activity 
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duration of 15 minutes and 12 separate activities were planned. An example of the AFTS Master Bundle entry is as 
follows: 
When Time >= Plan_Start+2:00 and ActInProgress=False 
    Start ECLSS.HalfTankBackupTransfer 
    When ECLSS.HalfTankBackupTransfer.SEQSTAT = 
     SEQ_ACTIVE 
         Set ActInProgress = True 
     End When 
 End When  
The master sequence continuously verifies the sequence’s status to determine whether the activity has completed 
nominally or off nominally as follows: 
When ECLSS.HalfTankBackupTransfer.SEQSTAT =  
 SEQ_FINISHED Or 
          ECLSS.HalfTankBackupTransfer.SEQSTAT = 
              SEQ_STOPPEDBYERROR  Or 
          ECLSS.HalfTankBackupTransfer.SEQSTAT = 
              SEQ_STOPPEDBYCMD Then 
         Set ActInProgress = False 
End When 
The Timeliner-TLX system allows any sequence the ability to monitor the status of any other sequence that is 
installed and is a built in feature of status variables that are predefined. Multiple plan executions were accomplished 
with the AFTS Master Bundle with failure injection during transfer operations and failover activations and the 
sequence FDIR did what it was programmed to do. After the first few runs, it became apparent that these type 
operations could be background activities and that the crew would not be required unless a fault occurred during 
safing operations that required manual intervention. We could force the plan to be out of synchronization with fluid 
quantities not being available, but the activities verified these and simply informed the crew and continued with the 
next activity when it was time.
VII. Alternate Way for Autonomous Execution 
The HAL 9000 System planning engine design[4] plans the intelligent procedures, produces a time-ordered 
linked list activity plan for the specific sub-system and also produces data arrays for each device and state of the 
device within the planning engines sub-system. These “state code” arrays contain the time stamped state of devices 
corresponding to the execution of the intelligent activities that is planned for the sub-system. The HAL 9000 
Execution Component Plan Monitor for the sub-system utilizes these states and time to determine if the real-time 
execution of activities is meeting the plan. The HAL 9000 Plan Monitor has the additional capability of executing 
the time tagged state codes in time order which is referred to as “Full Auto” mode. For the AFTS, the state code 
arrays for a ½ Tank Primary Fluid Transfer format and example content would be as follows: 
ActivityID 
Start Time 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Valve1
Time 
Open
Pump1 
Time 
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Figure 4: State Code Array Format 
We wanted to compare the different methods of execution although the HAL 9000 “Full Auto” mode is 
dependent upon the Fault Detection, Diagnostics and Response  (FDDR) Monitor for notification of failures, we 
could re-create the state code arrays by using a Timeliner-TLX sequence to load memory before starting the Plan 
Monitor. The Plan Monitor was then programmed to query the crew for “Full Auto” mode or “Monitor Only” mode. 
The state code array example above opens VALVE1 at the specified time before PUMP1 is turned on at its specified 
time. The issue in this execution is the timing during anomalies such as an AFTS failover from the primary transfer 
leg to the backup leg.  To accommodate the pre-planned failover that may or may not be executed, the failover 
activity is also scheduled as a successor activity and contains a duplicate negative activity id denoting contingency. 
The full scheduling of the state code arrays then appears as follows: 
Figure 5: Contingency Plan Sate Code’s 
The negative activity identifier correlates the contingency activity where Valve 2 and Pump 2 are commanded 
on. There is additional information in the state code arrays not covered here such as slip time and number of states 
as two examples not shown for simplicity and space savings.  
The state code arrays are used to determine whether a specific activity is meeting the plan when the HAL 9000 
Plan Monitor [3] sequence is not in the “Full Auto” mode. The Plan Monitor continuously verifies the state of each 
device in the plan and the time the device is supposed to be in this state while in Monitor Only mode. The HAL 
9000 Plan Monitor for the specific sub-system is dependent upon the FDDR Monitor [3][4] to generate a fault 
notification during execution of the nominal state code array for determination of contingency activation. The 
contingency activity id for the HAL 9000 system is simply a duplicate activity id that is negative in value which 
results in one activity with one contingency. The HAL 9000 Plan Monitor for the specific sub-system, upon 
notification of the failure from the FDDR Monitor while in “Full Auto” mode, inserts the times into the contingency 
state code arrays based upon the current time and the duration of the predecessor activity’s execution derived from 
the current time – the start time. The HAL 9000 FDDR Monitor specific to the sub-system performs the safing of the 
primary leg in this example, allowing the Plan Monitor to simply execute the contingency state codes. It should also 
be noted that no re-plan was required as the contingency was already built into the plan. The differences in 
execution between wholly contained intelligent Timeliner-TLX procedures and the HAL 9000 Execution 
Component “Full Auto” mode lies within the embedded FDIR employed within the intelligent procedures, versus a 
separate monitor that only knows whether a device or sub-system has failed. The intelligent procedure has the 
specifics to the actual safing that is required at any specific point in the procedure, while the FDDR Monitor has the 
generic safing capability and will need to check all devices for a safe state and command the ones that are needed. 
Timeliner-TLX provides the identification and status of all installed procedures that are in execution as a built-in 
ActivityID 
Start Time 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Valve1
Time 
Open
Pump1 
Time 
On
-ActivityID 
Start Time 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Device ID  
STime 
State 
Valve2
Time 
Open
Pump2 
Time 
On
On
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feature of this procedure system, which allows the FDDR Monitor more intelligence as it pertains to the higher level 
function that was being performed at the point of the failure. Essentially the FDDR Monitor can detect whether a 
Timeliner-TLX sequence is stopped by an error, stopped by command from the crew or in a finished condition. For 
the AFTS, no HAL9000 FDDR Monitor was employed and only Plan Monitor functionality developed for 
autonomous plan execution due to time constraints. In the HAL 9000 system, full-auto mode is selected at the 
planning engine interface versus the execution component such as in the AFTS testing. In this way the real-time 
planning engine has knowledge that an activity would be performed in this mode and hence knows the function that 
was to be performed and can perform the re-plan if an anomaly occurs.   
VIII. Execution Comparison 
After plan execution with both methods, the Master Bundle concept appears to be the better operational 
implementation for the AFTS due to the lack of a full HAL 9000 suite of planning engines and FDDR monitors, but 
is certainly dependent upon having intelligent procedures as failure without recovery may impact the activities that 
follow in the plan. An AFTS example of this condition is when a pump failure is induced, without recovery 
capability, the safing would occur such as the valve commanded close and power off of the pump but since the full 
transfer amount did not occur, there may not be sufficient fluid or fluid capacity to perform the next activity in the 
plan. Intelligent procedures with full embedded FDIR increases the success percentage of Master Bundle execution 
as each activity eventually comes to completion and the system is in a safe state for the next activity.  
The Full Auto Mode execution does not have procedures in operation, does not have knowledge of the higher 
level function being performed, and does not know the quantity of fluid being transferred. Essentially, the same 
operational effectiveness can be achieved via time-tagged command queue’s, where commands are stored in a buffer 
on-board and issued when the time tagged to the command is encountered. Command chaining is another example 
of how Full Auto Mode can be useful as each device entry that has a duplicate time would be commanded in the 
order they are encountered in the chain. A key feature of the Plan Monitor executing the state code arrays is that 
each command is verified before the next command entry is performed where command queue’s and command 
chains generally do not perform this verification. If a full HAL 9000 system had been employed, the FDDR monitor 
would have safed the system and then notified the Plan Monitor of the failure. The Planning engine for the specific 
system would then start the contingency activity and perform any real-time re-planning that was required. Since the 
HAL 9000 System would automatically re-plan upon notification of the failure, and a new updated plan produced, 
the distribution of actions would result in the same execution as the intelligent activity with the exception that a new 
plan would have been produced. 
The HAL 9000 combination of intelligent procedures along with the corresponding state code data for the plan 
allows both the autonomous execution of the plan of activities and the autonomous monitoring of the plan when the 
Plan Monitor is in Monitor Only mode. An autonomous operation requires monitoring and the capability to track 
real-time execution with planned events programmatically, results in less crew dependency and faster notification 
when the plan is not met. In summary, intelligent procedures can reduce the amount of external monitoring and 
planning that is required since these functions are wholly encompassed within the procedure. 
IX. Future Work 
An increase in complexity of the AFTS system is desired to fully exercise and expand on the distributed 
operations realized by the procedure architecture. Additional pressure sensors are to be added to the tanks to 
increase fault tolerance and logic, and additional recirculation pumps and filters will be added that will not only 
increase the operations requirements but also make temperature control available. The filter recirculation will be 
controlled via 3-way valves to allow filter / non-filter recirculation. Adding complexity and additional flight rules 
will help further prove the procedure architecture and its understanding of how adaptable it may be for multiple 
systems to be operated. As it pertains to intelligent procedures, the AMO team will be developing these type 
procedures to operate an EXPRESS Payload rack on-board the ISS in the near future. The procedures will be proved 
on the ground before interfacing them on-board for eventual crew usage. The intent of the EXPRESS operations is 
to provide single action functions for operating the rack to include power, thermal control, smoke detection and 
payload configuration, with embedded FDIR wherever possible. An interesting consideration as we begin this 
development is whether a system that was built with minimal intent of automation can be fully operated 
autonomously. This we shall see. 
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Appendix A 
Acronym List 
AES 
AFTS 
AMO 
COMM 
ECLSS
EXPRESS  
FDDR 
FDIR 
GNC
Advanced Exploration Systems 
Autonomous Fluid Transfer System 
Autonomous Mission Operations 
Communications 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
EXpedite the PRocessing of Experiments for Space Station Racks 
Fault Detection, Diagnostics and Response 
Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery 
Guidance , Navigation and Control 
HAL Higher Active Logic 
ISS 
MOL 
MSFC 
NASA 
OSTP 
TBE
International Space Station 
Mission Operations Lab 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Onboard Short Term Plan 
Teledyne Brown Engineering 
Appendix B 
Glossary
Autonomous Fluid 
Transfer System 
HAL 9000 Space 
Operating System 
Timeliner-TLX System 
A dual tank, computer controlled Test-Bed which mimics either a habitat water 
or a simplistic cryogenic fluid system. 
HAL 9000 Space Operating System is a crew-integrated, autonomous 
command and control system designed specifically for fully automated, long-
duration deep space vehicles.  
The Timeliner scripting language for expressing operational procedures.  The 
TLX integration platform is used for developing and executing Timeliner 
applications. Developed and maintained by Draper Laboratory.  Timeliner has 
been used in Space Shuttle simulation since 1982, on Space Shuttle since 1991, 
and on ISS since 1994; Timeliner-TLX was commercialized in 1997.  
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